Judge Told Jury To Ignore The Murder Date
From Ira Einhorn
October 17, 2005
That I did not kill Holly Maddux on September 11, 1977, as alleged by the prosecution for twenty-three years and steadfastly maintained through two trials, was demonstrated so strongly by the defense at my trial that Judge Mazzola was forced by his obvious bias to tell the jury to ignore the date, though the date was integral to what both the prosecution and the defense did at the trial.
His actions at the end of my trial as demonstrated in the enclosed two pages {Section Two} taken from my Superior Court Appeal, made a mockery of the trial and violated the very nature of Due Process, the foundation of American Law.
His “aside” (there are no asides in law) deprived me of a defense, for he changed what I was charged with after the trial was over, rendering the entire process a ludicrous and expensive farce.
His shameful behavior intensified by his ignorant attack on me at the end of the trial is in direct violation of the principles enunciated by Chief Justice Roberts in his confirmation hearing who made one thing clear: A judge at a trial must remain a referee no matter what his personal feelings.
Judge Mazzola was not a referee, but a second prosecutor during the entire trial bending over backwards to accommodate the prosecution by making conscious judicial error after judicial error that did away with any possibility of a fair trial.
His behavior was reprehensible.
What journalist has the courage to call his kangaroo court into question?
What Journalist has the courage to bring Mazzola’s actions into the cleansing light of the sun?
SECTION II
X. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT IN ASSESSING APPELLANT’S GUILT, IT WAS NOT BOUND BY THE DATE OF THE KILLING OF THE VICTIM THAT WAS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION, SEPTEMBER 11, 1977
The trial court erred when it instructed the jury that in assessing appellant’s guilt, it was not bound by the date of the killing of the victim that was alleged in the Information, September 11, 1977. As a result, appellant is entitled to a new trial.
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
“As an aside, I would also advise you that you are not necessarily bound by the date alleged in the indictment in this case. The date of the death is not an essential element of the crime.
You may find the defendant guilty if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged even though you’re not satisfied that it occurred precisely on the specific date mentioned on the bill of indictment.” (NT 10/16/02 p. 184).
Appellant submits that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that in assessing appellant’s guilt, it was not bound by the date of the killing of the victim that was alleged in the Information, September 11, 1977.
In Commonwealth v. Groff, 378 Pa/ Super. 353, 548 A.2d 1237 (1988), citing Commonwealth v. Devlin, 460 Pa 508, 333 A.2d 888 (1975), “the prosecution must fix the date when an alleged offense occurred with reasonable certainty.” The doctrine that the Commonwealth is allowed a reasonable measure of flexibility applies only in cases in which an assault on a child is involved. Id.
A variance in the date of the offense charged is fatal where it misleads the defendant at a trial, involves an element of surprise prejudicial to the defendant’s efforts to prepare his defense, precludes the defendant from anticipating the prosecution’s proof or impairs a substantial right. See Commonwealth v. Ohle, 503 Pa. 566, 470 A.2d 61 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Pope, 455 Pa. 384, 317 A.2d 887 (1974).
Herein, during appellant’s first trial, which was held in absentia, and his second trial the Commonwealth never wavered in its claim that Ms. Maddux was killed on September 11, 1977. Appellant’s defense against the charges was premised upon the fact that the commonwealth alleged that the killing occurred on September 11, 1977. Appellant presented a number of witnesses, including people who stayed in his apartment soon after the day on which the victim was killed, and people who saw the victim months after the date of the offense charged based upon the Commonwealth’s firm allegation that the victim met her death on September 11, 1977 (N.T. 10/9/02 p. 67-76, 97-110, 122, 145-156, 161-162, 165-167, 171-186). Had appellant known that the trial court intended to instruct the jury in this manner, he either would not have presented these witnesses or would have presented additional witnesses to cover a broader period of time.
The trial court’s instruction had the impact of significantly defeating or diminishing appellant’s defense. In view of the Commonwealth’s continued claim with regard to the date of death, it was not entitled to a jury instruction that had the effect of varying the date on which the victim met her death.
Under these circumstances, the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that in assessing appellant’s guilt, it was not bound by the date of the killing of the victim that was alleged in the Information, September 11, 1977. Accordingly, appellant is entitled to a new trial.
October 17, 2005
That I did not kill Holly Maddux on September 11, 1977, as alleged by the prosecution for twenty-three years and steadfastly maintained through two trials, was demonstrated so strongly by the defense at my trial that Judge Mazzola was forced by his obvious bias to tell the jury to ignore the date, though the date was integral to what both the prosecution and the defense did at the trial.
His actions at the end of my trial as demonstrated in the enclosed two pages {Section Two} taken from my Superior Court Appeal, made a mockery of the trial and violated the very nature of Due Process, the foundation of American Law.
His “aside” (there are no asides in law) deprived me of a defense, for he changed what I was charged with after the trial was over, rendering the entire process a ludicrous and expensive farce.
His shameful behavior intensified by his ignorant attack on me at the end of the trial is in direct violation of the principles enunciated by Chief Justice Roberts in his confirmation hearing who made one thing clear: A judge at a trial must remain a referee no matter what his personal feelings.
Judge Mazzola was not a referee, but a second prosecutor during the entire trial bending over backwards to accommodate the prosecution by making conscious judicial error after judicial error that did away with any possibility of a fair trial.
His behavior was reprehensible.
What journalist has the courage to call his kangaroo court into question?
What Journalist has the courage to bring Mazzola’s actions into the cleansing light of the sun?
SECTION II
X. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT IN ASSESSING APPELLANT’S GUILT, IT WAS NOT BOUND BY THE DATE OF THE KILLING OF THE VICTIM THAT WAS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION, SEPTEMBER 11, 1977
The trial court erred when it instructed the jury that in assessing appellant’s guilt, it was not bound by the date of the killing of the victim that was alleged in the Information, September 11, 1977. As a result, appellant is entitled to a new trial.
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
“As an aside, I would also advise you that you are not necessarily bound by the date alleged in the indictment in this case. The date of the death is not an essential element of the crime.
You may find the defendant guilty if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged even though you’re not satisfied that it occurred precisely on the specific date mentioned on the bill of indictment.” (NT 10/16/02 p. 184).
Appellant submits that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that in assessing appellant’s guilt, it was not bound by the date of the killing of the victim that was alleged in the Information, September 11, 1977.
In Commonwealth v. Groff, 378 Pa/ Super. 353, 548 A.2d 1237 (1988), citing Commonwealth v. Devlin, 460 Pa 508, 333 A.2d 888 (1975), “the prosecution must fix the date when an alleged offense occurred with reasonable certainty.” The doctrine that the Commonwealth is allowed a reasonable measure of flexibility applies only in cases in which an assault on a child is involved. Id.
A variance in the date of the offense charged is fatal where it misleads the defendant at a trial, involves an element of surprise prejudicial to the defendant’s efforts to prepare his defense, precludes the defendant from anticipating the prosecution’s proof or impairs a substantial right. See Commonwealth v. Ohle, 503 Pa. 566, 470 A.2d 61 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Pope, 455 Pa. 384, 317 A.2d 887 (1974).
Herein, during appellant’s first trial, which was held in absentia, and his second trial the Commonwealth never wavered in its claim that Ms. Maddux was killed on September 11, 1977. Appellant’s defense against the charges was premised upon the fact that the commonwealth alleged that the killing occurred on September 11, 1977. Appellant presented a number of witnesses, including people who stayed in his apartment soon after the day on which the victim was killed, and people who saw the victim months after the date of the offense charged based upon the Commonwealth’s firm allegation that the victim met her death on September 11, 1977 (N.T. 10/9/02 p. 67-76, 97-110, 122, 145-156, 161-162, 165-167, 171-186). Had appellant known that the trial court intended to instruct the jury in this manner, he either would not have presented these witnesses or would have presented additional witnesses to cover a broader period of time.
The trial court’s instruction had the impact of significantly defeating or diminishing appellant’s defense. In view of the Commonwealth’s continued claim with regard to the date of death, it was not entitled to a jury instruction that had the effect of varying the date on which the victim met her death.
Under these circumstances, the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that in assessing appellant’s guilt, it was not bound by the date of the killing of the victim that was alleged in the Information, September 11, 1977. Accordingly, appellant is entitled to a new trial.
posted by Nayer | 10:53 AM
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